Lukács's 1967 Preface to History and Class Consciousness by Lucero-Montaño, Alfredo
LUKÁCS’S 1967 PREFACE TO HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
by Alfredo Lucero-Montaño 
 
 
Georg Lukács in his 1967 “Preface” of History and Class Consciousness (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1999) critizes his deviation from Marxism. In his attempt to explain all ideological 
phenomena by reference to their basis in economics, he failed to use a fundamental Marxist 
category, that is, the human activity per excellence, labour: “labour as the mediator of the 
metabolic interaction between society and nature, is missing” (p. xvii). The consequence of this 
omission means “the disappearance of the ontological objectivity of nature upon which this 
process of change is based. But it also means the disappearance of the interaction between labour 
as seen from a genuinely materialist standpoint and the evolution of the men who labour” (Loc. 
cit.). Here Lukács recalls Marx’s great insight that “’even production for the sake of production 
means nothing more than the development of the production energies of man, and hence the 
development of the productive of the wealth of human nature as an end in itself’”(Loc. cit.). 
  
Lukács’ attempt to restore the nature of Marx’s theories by renovating and extending 
Hegel’s dialectics and method led him to its opposite: an abstract and idealistic approach of the 
central concept of praxis. Nevertheless, Lukács’ subjectivism gave rise to a key explanatory 
concept of the historical process, namely, the “imputed class consciousness”. But this 
consciousness was in fact isolated from any sort of praxis, that is, it was a pure contemplative 
consciousness. As a result, the absence of a basis in real praxis leads to its opposite: a relapse 
into idealistic contemplation. In Lukács’s own words: “my account of the contradictions of 
capitalism…is unintentionally coloured by an overriding subjectivism” (p. xviii). 
  
One of Lukács’ main concerns is the question of alienation. This question is treated as 
central to the critique of capitalism, and which has its theoretical and methodological roots in the 
Hegelian dialectics. At the time the problem of alienation was dealt in Hegelian terminology, that 
is, “its ultimate philosophical foundation is the identical subject-object that realizes itself in the 
historical process…when the highest stage of absolute spirit is attained…by abolishing alienation 




and by the return of self-consciousness to itself, thus realizing the identical subject-object” (pp. 
xxii). Of course, in Hegel this process arises in a logical and philosophical form, while in Lukács 
“this process is socio-historical and it culminates when the proletariat reaches this stage in its 
class-consciousness, thus becoming the identical subject-object of history” (Ibidem). This 
appears as if the Hegelian theses has found “its authentic realization in the existence and the 
consciousness of the proletariat”, and in turn provides “a philosophical foundation for the 
proletariat’s efforts…to conclude the ‘prehistory’ of mankind” (p. xxiii). But Lukács rightly 
dismisses the notion of a purely metaphysical realization of the identical subject-object, and 
more important, he also rejects the constitution of an identical subject-object by self-
knowledge—however perfect that self-knowledge is—yet truly based on an adequate knowledge 
of society. This has a distorting effect on the understanding of the historical process: “The 
proletariat seen as the identical subject-object of the real history of mankind is no materialist 
consummation that overcomes the constructions of idealism. It is rather an attempt to out-Hegel 
Hegel” (p. xxiii). That is, an attempt “to homogenize” reality, to process history above every 
possible reality. 
  
Certainly, Hegel is the first philosopher to stress the concept of alienation as the 
fundamental problem of the place of man in the world. However, in the term “alienation” he 
includes every type of objectification, that is, alienation is identical with objectification. 
According to Hegel, when the identical subject-object transcends alienation it must also 
transcend objectification at the same time. But as the subject takes back the object, which exists 
only as an alienation from self-consciousness, this would mean the end of objective reality and of 
any reality at all. Here the irreducibility of the object is ignored, and the objectivity is reduced to 
the pure determinations of the subject. Though these determinations are abstract, because the 
subject’s activity is conscience in a purely theoretical way. Lukács acknowledges this 
fundamental and crude error. “For objectification is indeed a phenomenon that cannot be 
eliminated from human life in society…[because] every externalization of an object in 
practice…is an objectification” (p. xxiv). 
  
This follows from the false opposition of fundamental categories (dualism), that is, from 
the misunderstanding about the dialectical unity subject/object. The fundamental theoretical 




claim of the dialectical conception does not lead to a negation of the object or the subject, but to 
the separation of both, that is, the idea that they are sides of reality constituted by and for 
themselves, and therefore, rationally separated. 
  
The traditional materialism, for instance, conceives the relation subject/object as an 
opposition. Here reality is seen as something constituted by itself, and not as a product of social 
activity, that is, separated from its relation with the subject. Marx criticism aims this 
misconception when he introduces the notion of ‘praxis’: “The chief defect of all previous 
materialism (including Feuerbach’s) is that the object, actuality, sensuousness is conceived only 
in the form of the object or perception, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not 
subjectively. Hence in opposition to materialism the active side was developed by idealism—but 
only abstractly since idealism naturally does not know actual, sensuous activity as such” (Marx’s 
first thesis on Feuerbach). 
  
In other words, social reality does not exist as an object by itself, but as a product of 
subject activity. Here is important to establish that the subjective element in the constitution of 
reality does not arise from the theoretical activity only, but from all the forms of social practice. 
In short, the relation subject/object is a phenomenon endowed with unity, that is, the terms of the 
relation does not take place outside it. 
  
Thus the fundamental claim of dialectics consists in the affirmation of the unity or the 
relation subject/object as the comprehensive basis of the social process. In the dialectical 
conception of the subject/object—where each one appears as a relation or unity of it, and not as a 
piece of that relation—men are not outside the world, or standing in front of reality; existence 
does not take place on the margins of the world, or outside of social reality where they constitute 
themselves as subjects. In other words, the subject and the object reciprocally constitute 
themselves in the construction of reality, where one moment of this reality is the subject’s praxis, 
and the other, is related with the social materiality in the constitution of subjectivity. 
  
Marx thought the historical process as a totality endowed with an internal coherence, in 
which every part is conditioned by the whole and, at the same time, the rest is conditioned by 




each part. Thus this notion led Marx to claim that the socio-historical process is an intelligible, 
coherent, structured and dynamic reality, but this reality can only be understood and penetrated 
as a totality by means of a rationality that endowes the unity of theory and practice. The world 
can only be understood by means of that principle. “The coincidence of the change of 
circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be comprehended and rationally 
understood only as…practice” (Marx’s third thesis on Feuerbach). Certainly, Hegel stated that 
“truth must be understood and expressed not merely as substance, but also as subject’, but Marx 
discovered ‘the truth as subject”, that is, as praxis. 
  
Lukács asserts that “only the class can actively penetrate the reality of society and 
transform it in its entirety” (p. 39). Thus class criticism provides the dialectical unity of theory 
and practice, and it means “the relation to society as a whole” (p. 50). When this relation is 
established, men’s consciousness of its existence emerges as a twofold dialectical determination: 
“as something which is subjectively justified in the social and historical situation…[and] at the 
same, time, objectively, it bypasses the essence of the evolution of society and fails to pinpoint it 
and express it adequately…it appears as a ‘false consciousness’” (Ibidem). In other words, this 
“false consciousness” may be seen as something that fails subjectively to reach its own ends, 
while realizing the objective aims of society. 
  
The analysis of the dialectical determination of consciousness allow us to distinguish 
between “the naive description of what men in fact thought, felt and wanted at any moment in 
history…and the thoughts and feelings appropriate to their objective situation” (p. 51). The class 
consciousness consists in “the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ to a particular typical 
position in the process of production” (Ibidem). Here we must recall Marx’s insight: 
“Consciousness does not determine life, but life determines consciousness” (The German 
Ideology in Selected Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994, p. 112). Thus the analysis does not 
infer the real social relations of men from what they think or believe, but determines what men 
believe from their real social relations. Lukács in this order of ideas asserts that “class-
consciousness implies a class-conditioned unconsciousness of one’s own socio-historical and 
economic condition. This condition is given as a definite structural relation…which appears to 




govern the whole life. The ‘falseness’, the illusion implicit in this situation…it is simply the 
intellectual reflex of the objective economic structure” (p. 52). 
  
How can an effective class-consciousnes be achieved? For Lukács, the ideological 
maturity of a social class becomes when it acquires a true understanding of its class situation and 
a true-class-consciousness, to wit, it becomes a class ‘for itself’. This means that the class—
subject to the modes of existence of capitalism—must transcend its reified mode of existence. 
Lukács remarks that “modern capitalism does not content itself with transforming the relations of 
production in accordance with its own needs. It also integrates into its own system those forms of 
primitive capitalism that led an isolated existence” (p. 93). The forms of capitalism adulterate 
man’s life forms, since in the relations between men--as well as the relations between man and 
objects that should gratify their real needs--lies hidden a ‘commodity relation’. The reified mind 
does not recognize these ‘commodity relations’, and moreover regards them as true-value forms 
of life. The reason for this Lukács claims is that: “The divorce of the phenomena of reification 
from their economic bases…is facilitated by the fact that the [capitalist] process of 
transformation must embrace every manifestation of the life of society if the preconditions for 
the complete self-realization of capitalist production are to be fulfilled” (p. 95). Man’s life 
relations are mediated by objects, which its “commodity character” distorts them. 
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